Uncertainty in BRCA1 cancer susceptibility testing by Dudley, William N. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Uncertainty in BRCA1 cancer susceptibility testing. 
By: Bonnie Baty, William Dudley, Adrian Musters and Anita Kinney 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: 
Baty, B.J., W.N. Dudley, A. Musters , and A.Y. Kinney, Uncertainty in BRCA1 cancer 
susceptibility testing. American Journal of Medical Genetics Part C: Seminars in Medical 
Genetics, 2006. 142C(4): p. 241-250. 
which has been published in final form at: https://doi.org/10.1002/ajmg.c.30112  
Abstract: 
This study investigated uncertainty in individuals undergoing genetic counseling/testing for 
breast/ovarian cancer susceptibility. Sixty-three individuals from a single kindred with a known 
BRCA1 mutation rated uncertainty about 12 items on a five-point Likert scale before and 1 
month after genetic counseling/testing. Factor analysis identified a five-item total uncertainty 
scale that was sensitive to changes before and after testing. The items in the scale were related to 
uncertainty about obtaining health care, positive changes after testing, and coping well with 
results. The majority of participants (76%) rated reducing uncertainty as an important reason for 
genetic testing. The importance of reducing uncertainty was stable across time and unrelated to 
anxiety or demographics. Yet, at baseline, total uncertainty was low and decreased after genetic 
counseling/testing (P = 0.004). Analysis of individual items showed that after genetic 
counseling/testing, there was less uncertainty about the participant detecting cancer early 
(P = 0.005) and coping well with their result (P < 0.001). Our findings support the importance to 
clients of genetic counseling/testing as a means of reducing uncertainty. Testing may help clients 
to reduce the uncertainty about items they can control, and it may be important to differentiate 
the sources of uncertainty that are more or less controllable. Genetic counselors can help clients 
by providing anticipatory guidance about the role of uncertainty in genetic testing.  
Keywords: genetic testing | cancer genetics | African Americans | cancer susceptibility | cancer 
testing | medical genetics | genetic counseling 
Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
Many practitioners believe that genetic testing has the potential to decrease uncertainty 
associated with genetic risk [Meissen et al., 1991; Decruyenaere et al., 1993; Baum et al., 1997]. 
This belief grows out of theories in the social sciences that were later applied to medicine 
[Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Mishel, 1988, 1997, 1999; Hilton, 1994]. The medical and 
psychological literature suggest that uncertainty is a major cause of stress, that it decreases 
quality of life and psychosocial adjustment, and that it has an immobilizing effect on coping 
processes [Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Christman et al., 1988; Mishel, 1988, 1997, 1999; 
Hilton, 1994; Germino et al., 1998]. Uncertainty can limit the person's effective control and 
sense of control over the danger and thereby increase their feelings of helplessness and stress. 
 
The medical and psychological literature suggest that uncertainty is a major cause of stress, that 
it decreases quality of life and psychosocial adjustment, and that it has an immobilizing effect on 
coping processes. Uncertainty can limit the person's effective control and sense of control over 
the danger and thereby increase their feelings of helplessness and stress. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Mishel 1981, 1990 wrote extensively about the uncertainty in Illness 
model, and developed an uncertainty scale. For a comprehensive review of studies of uncertainty 
in illness, uncertainty appraisal, and the relationship between uncertainty, coping, and adaptation, 
see Mast [1995]. Mast notes the lack of studies in multicultural populations or populations with 
few adaptive resources. 
 
Many studies have shown that reducing uncertainty is a common reason cited by individuals 
utilizing genetic testing [Mastromauro et al., 1987; Meissen et al., 1991; Decruyenaere et al., 
1993; Tibben et al., 1993; van der Steenstraten et al., 1994; Bernhardt et al., 1997; Tessaro et al., 
1997]. However, several studies have suggested that genetic testing does not always result in a 
reduction in uncertainty [Wertz et al., 1984; Codori and Brandt, 1994; van Zuuren et al., 1997]. 
Other studies have suggested that in some instances, individuals with high uncertainty may avoid 
genetic testing [Croyle et al., 1995; Cypowyj et al., 2003]. In our clinical experience, clients 
typically describe the desired certainty in terms of settling whether or not they will develop the 
condition in question, but often ignore the other sources of uncertainty inherent in genetic 
testing. For example, uncertainty may also be associated with the maintenance of health, genetic 
transmission, lifestyle change (choosing surgery, more frequent screening and medical visits), 
reliability and mutation-specific effects of tests and test results, whether and when the feared 
condition develops after a positive test, and potential loss of insurance or employment as 
“payment” for medical knowledge. In spite of the widespread interest in genetic testing as a 
means of reducing uncertainty, few studies have examined clients' perceptions of uncertainty 
beyond the desire to reduce uncertainty and no studies have examined uncertainty before and 
after genetic counseling/testing. 
 
Baum et al. [1997] propose a model that predicts long-term distress when risk analysis suggests a 
very high risk, when uncertainty is not reduced, when results of testing are at odds with 
preventive actions already taken, and when people who receive a positive, risk-increasing result 
lack strong social support, coping skills, other psychosocial resources, or all of these. The model 
is based on Lazarus and Folkman's [1984] model of stress and coping. 
 
The literature summarized above attests to the important role of uncertainty in genetic testing, 
yet more empiric evidence is needed to examine the complex role of uncertainty in the lives of 
individuals undergoing genetic counseling/testing. At the time this study was done there were no 
published measures of uncertainty that were specific to genetic counseling/testing. There is 
evidence that many consumers and providers of genetic counseling/testing value its role in 
reducing uncertainty, and there is also some evidence that genetic testing leaves tested 
individuals with considerable uncertainty. 
 
The purpose of our study was to measure uncertainty about different aspects of genetic 
counseling/testing (access to medical care, insurance problems, inheritance, coping, desire for 
prophylactic surgeries, outcomes of testing) before and after testing from the perspective of 
individuals at high risk for carrying a BRCA1 mutation. Based on our clinical observations and 
knowledge of the literature available in 2001, we developed a series of 12 items to measure 
uncertainty associated with genetic counseling and cancer susceptibility testing. 
 
Based on our clinical observations and knowledge of the literature available in 2001, we 
developed a series of 12 items to measure uncertainty associated with genetic counseling and 
cancer susceptibility testing. 
 
Our secondary aim was to determine the reliability and validity of the uncertainty scale we 
developed for potential future use as a measure of uncertainty related to genetic 
counseling/testing. 
 
The uncertainty items related to the following observations: 
 
1 Discussions with clients in the counseling session suggested that (a) a key concern for many 
clients was the likelihood of their children inheriting cancer susceptibility, (b) uncertainty about 
this risk appeared to be causing distress to the parent, and (c) parents expected the testing to help 
resolve the uncertainty. 
2 Counselors often had lengthy discussions with clients about cancer prevention afforded by 
prophylactic mastectomy and/or oophorectomy, and clients frequently exhibited uncertainty 
about these surgical preventive options. 
3 Many clients came to genetic counseling sessions with information or questions about the risk 
of insurance problems after genetic testing and we perceived uncertainty associated with this 
potential risk. 
4 Clients often left a genetic counseling session with an expanded view of potential risks and 
benefits of testing and this sometimes appeared to engender uncertainty about experiencing 
positive and negative outcomes of testing. 
5 Clients appeared to have variable degrees of trust in the medical system to provide optimal care 
and access to care. This has historically been of particular concern to African Americans, who 
typically have a higher degree of distrust of the medical system [Gamble, 1993; Thompson et al., 
2003]. 
 
STUDY HYPOTHESES 
Our general hypothesis was that genetic counseling/testing does not reduce uncertainty, but 
rather reframes it. We developed the following specific hypotheses. 
 
1 At baseline, the majority of study participants will cite decreasing uncertainty as an important 
reason for genetic testing. 
2 Individuals with higher levels of uncertainty at baseline will be more likely to think decreasing 
uncertainty is important. 
3 Total uncertainty will not decrease after genetic counseling/testing. Some individual 
uncertainty items will increase while others will decrease. 
4 Variables associated with vulnerability (personal cancer history, family history, carrier status, 
medical insurance, perceived risk, cancer genetic knowledge, depression, anxiety, fatalism, 
religiosity, trust in doctor) will be associated with the total uncertainty score. 
5 A decrease in anxiety will be associated with a decrease in uncertainty. 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
Data were collected as part of a larger study of an African American kindred (Family Health 
Study) with more than 30 cases of breast/ovarian cancer and an identified BRCA1 mutation 
[Kinney et al., 2005, 2006]. The Family Health Study was a prospective observational cohort 
study that evaluated the extent to which culturally-sensitive genetic education, counseling and 
testing influence health behaviors and psychosocial outcomes among kindred members. The 
study was conducted after approval by Institutional Review Boards at the University of Utah 
(Utah) and Louisiana State University (LSU). Data was collected between 2001 and 2005. The 
main study offered genetic counseling and testing to individuals in the kindred and collected data 
using a computer assisted interview. These data were exported to SPSS [2004] and SAS [2002] 
for the analyses reported here. 
 
Sample 
Our sample consisted of 63 individuals from a single African American (Creole) kindred. The 
choice of an African American kindred was a matter of convenience, as we were able to add our 
uncertainty items to a parent study of health behavior outcomes. One hundred five members of 
the kindred were initially enrolled and provided data before the first genetic counseling session 
(baseline). At follow-up, which was approximately 1 month (median 28.5 days) after testing (or 
genetic counseling, if testing was not done), 63 of the initial 105 (60%) provided follow-up data. 
The remaining 42 were either lost to follow-up (n = 21) entirely or did not complete the 1-month 
interview but completed subsequent interviews (n = 21). Those who did not complete the 1-
month interview were younger than those who were retained (37.57 vs. 42.63, t(103) = 1.83, 
P = 0.07). Males were less likely to complete the 1-month interview than females (46% of males 
vs. 67% of females, χ2(1) = 4.46, P = 0.04). No differences between those who did not complete 
the 1-month interview and those who did were found in employment status, religious affiliation, 
marital status, income, carrier status (carrier vs. non-carrier), or importance of decreasing 
uncertainty as a reason for genetic testing. However, there were 18 individuals who did not have 
genetic testing, and none of them participated in the 1-month interview. The following results are 
reported for 63 participants who provided baseline and 1-month follow-up data. Some categories 
are missing data because participants did not answer all questions. Sample characteristics of the 
sample at baseline are provided in Table I. 
 
 
 
 
Table I. Sample Characteristics 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev 
Age 18 82 42.6 15.0 
Number of children 0 10 1.2 1.6 
Number of daughters 0 4 0.6 0.9 
Number of sons 0 6 0.6 1.0 
    Frequency Percent   
Gender 
 Male   16 25.4   
 Female   47 74.6   
Race 
 Black or African American   63 100   
Ethnic background 
 Creole   54 88.5   
 Other   6 9.8   
 None   1 1.6   
Hispanic         
 Yes   0 0   
 No   61 100   
Employment status 
 Full time   37 58.7   
 Part time   8 12.7   
 Unemployed   2 3.2   
 Retired   3 4.8   
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev 
 In school   3 4.8   
 Keep house   9 14.3   
 Other   1 1.6   
Education 
 Jr high school or less   1 1.6   
 Some high school   8 9.5   
 High school graduate   14 22.2   
 Some college   27 42.9   
 College graduate   11 17.5   
 Post-graduate degree   2 3.2   
Religion         
 Catholic   41 66.1   
 Protestant   3 4.8   
 Other   16 25.8   
 Not a religious person   2 3.2   
Marital status 
 Married   34 54.0   
 Living as married   2 3.2   
 Separated   2 3.2   
 Divorced   4 6.3   
 Widowed   6 9.5   
 Never married   15 23.8   
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev 
Income 
 Less than $20,000   15 24.6   
 $20,000–$40,000   18 29.5   
 $41,000–$74,000   17 27.9   
 More than $75,000   11 18.0   
Covered by private health insurance         
 Yes   40 63.5   
 No   23 36.5   
Covered by public health insurance 
 Yes   4 8.7   
 No   42 91.3   
Carrier status by gender 
  
Females Males 
N % N % 
Non-carriers 39 83.0 12 75.0 
Carriers 8 17.0 4 25.0 
 
Measures 
Reasons for testing 
In the parent study, individuals were asked to rate a list of possible reasons for genetic testing. 
The item related to uncertainty was to eliminate/reduce uncertainty. The responses for this item 
were 1 = “Not at all Important,” 2 = “Slightly Important,” 3 = “Somewhat Important,” 
4 = “Important,” or 5 = “Very Important.” We used this item to determine whether study 
participants felt that decreasing uncertainty was an important reason for testing (hypothesis 1). 
 
Uncertainty related to genetic counseling/testing 
In order to measure uncertainty related to multiple aspects of genetic counseling/testing and 
compare uncertainty before and after counseling/testing (hypothesis 3), we developed a 12-item 
measure related to uncertainty regarding genetic testing that were asked both at baseline and one-
month follow-up (Table II). Participants were asked, “How certain or uncertain are you about the 
following statements?” For example, one uncertainty item was I can get the medical care I need 
to reduce my chances of getting cancer. Responses were 1 = “Very uncertain,” 2 = “Uncertain,” 
3 = “Neither certain or uncertain,” 4 = “Certain,” or 5 = “Very certain.” These responses were 
later recoded from 5 “Very uncertain” to 1 “Very certain” so that our analysis reflects 
uncertainty rather than certainty. Mean scores for all participants answering the item were 
compared for individual items at baseline and 1-month follow-up. 
 
Table II. Uncertainty Items 
How certain or uncertain are you about the following statements? 
 1. My daughters/future daughters will inherit the BRCA1 gene change or alteration in my family 
 2. My sons/future sons will inherit the BRCA1 gene change or alteration in my family 
 3. I am unlikely to have problems with insurance because of BRCA1 testing 
 4. I know whether I want to have preventive surgery to avoid the risk of cancer 
 5. Learning my chances of getting cancer will [has] negatively affect[ed] my life 
 6. *I can get the medical care I need to reduce my chances of getting cancer 
 7. *I can get the cancer screening I need (like mammograms, breast exam, or blood tests) to increase my chances of 
early diagnosis if I do get cancer 
 8. **I will cope [am coping] well with my genetic test result 
 9. **I will have [have had] positive changes in my life after learning the results of my genetic test 
 10. **I will be able to detect signs of cancer early 
 11. **I will follow through with recommended cancer detection check ups 
 12. **My physician or health care provider will be able to detect signs of cancer early 
1. Very certain 
2. Certain 
3. Neither certain or uncertain 
4. Uncertain 
5. Very uncertain 
Square brackets reflect the way the item was phrased at time 2. Using factor analysis, * and ** indicate 
clusters 
Instrument refinement for the measurement of uncertainty was conducted on all baseline data to 
capitalize on the larger sample (n = 105). For pooled comparisons regarding associations 
between total uncertainty and the desire to decrease uncertainty (hypothesis 2), vulnerability 
variables (hypothesis 4), anxiety (hypothesis 5), and demographic variables, our initial pool of 12 
items was first reduced to a set of 7 as follows. Three items were missing data for 20% or more 
of the sample. These items are numbered 1, 2, and 4 in Table II. Although reasons why 
participants declined to answer these items are unknown, we assume that those respondents 
without sons or daughters or planning not to have children did not provide data to items 1 or 2. 
Missing data for item 4 (regarding preventative surgery) was strongly gender related with 86% of 
males missing data and only 3% of females missing data. This suggests that males did not think 
preventative surgery was pertinent to them. Thus items 1 and 2 were eliminated because they 
were not applicable to many participants and were thus missing. Items 3, 4, and 5 were 
eliminated because they show corrected item to total correlations below 0.2. This resulted in a 
measure of uncertainty of seven items which are indicated by asterisks in Table II. Exploratory 
factor analysis (using maximum likelihood estimation and varimax rotation) was used to 
examine the factor structure of these seven items. There was some evidence of a two factor 
structure in that two eigenvalues were greater than one and there was a significant improvement 
in goodness of fit with the two factor solution (χ2(14) = 39.6 for the one factor and χ2(8) = 17.0 
for the two factor solution). In this two factor solution, we termed the first factor with two items 
(indicated by single asterisks) as an Access Uncertainty factor. These two items were related to 
uncertainty about access to appropriate medical care. We characterized the second factor with 
five items (shown as two asterisks in Table I) as a Control Uncertainty factor. These items 
related to uncertainty about the control the client has to cope, follow through with 
recommendations, and detect cancer early. Further evaluation of these two scales indicated that 
both scales were at the low end of acceptable internal consistency reliability for a newly 
developed scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.62 and 0.65 for Control Uncertainty and Access 
Uncertainty, respectively) [Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994]. The Control Uncertainty factor 
showed better sensitivity to change than the two item Access Uncertainty scale or the total of the 
seven items taken together, and thus we report results from that five-item scale as the total 
uncertainty score. 
 
Psychological well-being 
Anxiety was measured using the 20-item state anxiety scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
STAI—Form Y [Spielberger et al., 1971]. The STAI is the most widely used measure of anxiety. 
The presence of depressive symptoms was measured using the CES-D Scale (Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale) [Radloff, 1977]. This scale was developed for use in 
the general population to measure symptoms of depression with a focus on affective components, 
including feeling depressed, hopeless, fearful, or sad. This scale has been used extensively in 
social science research and internal consistency was high (α = 0.87) in a previous pilot study of 
this kindred [Kinney et al., 2005]. These scales were used together as a measure of psychological 
well-being. We examined whether there was an association between the change in total 
uncertainty and the change in distress before and after counseling/testing (hypothesis 5). 
 
Fatalism 
Cancer fatalism was measured with the 15-item Powe [1995] Fatalism Inventory, composed of 
four subscales that measure fear about cancer, cancer pessimism, predetermination, and 
inevitability of death using a yes/no format (α = 0.73). This instrument has established reliability 
and validity in African Americans (Chronbach's alpha = 0.84–0.87). 
 
Hereditary cancer knowledge 
A 10-item knowledge questionnaire developed by the Cancer Genetics Consortium and adapted 
for this study was used to assess knowledge about hereditary breast and ovarian cancer [Lerman 
et al., 1996]. 
 
Perceived cancer risk 
Perceived risk was measured using two questions for breast cancer, In your opinion, how likely 
is it that you will develop breast cancer in your lifetime? (Very unlikely, Unlikely, Moderate 
Chance, Likely, Very likely, I have already had breast cancer), and What do you think the 
chances are the you will get breast cancer sometime during your lifetime? (Percent, Has had both 
breasts removed), and the equivalent questions for ovarian cancer. These questions have been 
used in several other studies to measure risk perception [Codori et al., 1999; Durfy et al., 1999], 
including high-risk African Americans [Hughes et al., 1996]. 
 
Trust of health care providers 
Trust in medical care providers was measured by a six item Likert type scale adopted from 
Safran et al. [1998]. An example item was worded, “My doctor cares as much as I do about my 
health.” Response ranged from 1, “Strongly disagree” to 5, “Strongly Agree.” The scale showed 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83). All items were recoded such that 
higher values indicated higher trust. The total score was a simple total of all items and ranged 
from 1 to 20 (mean = 12.79, SD = 3.86). 
 
Religiosity 
Religiosity was measured using a four-item scale. A sample item was worded, “How strong 
would you say your religious or spiritual faith is?” Responses to these items ranged from 1, “Not 
at all strong” to 4, “Very strong.” The scale showed good reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.81). 
All items were recoded such that higher values indicated higher religiosity. The scale was 
created as a sum of all items. The range for the sample was 1–12 (mean = 9.48, SD = 2.62). 
 
Statistical Analysis 
We used McNemar's exact test [Pett, 1997] to compare the binary variables' importance of 
reducing uncertainty at baseline with responses at 1-month (related to hypothesis 1). The 
association between the perceived importance of genetic testing in reducing uncertainty and total 
uncertainty scores (hypothesis 2) was evaluated using Spearman Correlation. We examined 
changes from baseline to follow-up in the responses across all uncertainty items (hypothesis 3) 
using t-tests. Considering baseline total uncertainty score as a continuous variable, Pearson 
correlations were performed with other continuous (or close) variables (age, number of children, 
education, income, knowledge of cancer genetics, religiosity, perceived risk, depression, trust in 
doctor, and cancer fatalism) (hypothesis 4). ANOVAs were performed with categorical variables 
(marital status, personal cancer history, presence or absence of first degree relatives, BRCA1 
carrier status, employment, and presence or absence of medical insurance) (hypothesis 4 and 
demographic variables). The association between the STAI or the CES-D Scale and total 
uncertainty scores (hypothesis 5) were evaluated using Pearson's correlation. For all analyses, 
results were considered significant if the P-value was ≤0.05. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Sample Characteristics 
The study population of this single kindred was 75% female and 100% African American. The 
mean age was 42.6 (SD 15.0) and mean number of children was 1.2. Most were employed 
(71.4%; 9.6% were retired or in school) and had at least a high school education (85.8%). About 
half were married, 96.7% listed a religion and incomes were varied. Sixty-four percent had 
private health insurance and 9% had public health insurance. Fifty one (81%) were non-carriers; 
12 (19%) were carriers. The data were gathered from 29 sibling groups. Fifty-two participants 
had at least one other sibling in the study. The number of siblings ranged from zero to five. The 
majority of groups had zero or one sibling (52%), and the mean sibling group size was 1.17. The 
sibling indicator was used in the analyses reported below to control for within family (at the 
sibling level) correlations. 
 
Importance of Reducing Uncertainty 
At baseline, the vast majority (76%) of individuals thought that reducing uncertainty was either 
an important or very important reason for genetic testing. This rating of the importance of 
reducing uncertainty at baseline did not differ by age, gender, marital status, income, education, 
or work status. 
 
At baseline, the vast majority (76%) of individuals thought that reducing uncertainty was either 
an important or very important reason for genetic testing. This rating of the importance of 
reducing uncertainty at baseline did not differ by age, gender, marital status, income, education, 
or work status. 
 
When comparing the importance of reducing uncertainty at baseline with responses at 1-month 
following receipt of test results we found no differences in the rating of importance over time 
(P = 0.95). In addition, we found no relationship between state anxiety and importance of genetic 
testing in reducing uncertainty either at either baseline or follow-up. Thus, the importance of 
reducing uncertainty was rated as very high by participants, was stable across time, and was 
unrelated to individual-level demographics or anxiety. 
 
Comparison of Uncertainty Items Before Genetic Counseling/Testing (Baseline) 
For those who answered all of the uncertainty items at both baseline and follow-up (n = 63), the 
internal consistency reliability was 0.70 at baseline and 0.81 at follow-up. The total uncertainty 
score was computed as the mean score of each of the answered items such that high scores 
indicate high uncertainty. The highest score at baseline was 4.4 and the lowest score was 1.0, 
with a mean of 2.34 (sd = 0.66) across the five items for all participants. The highest score at 
follow-up was 4.8, and the lowest score was 1.0, with a mean of 2.03 (sd = 0.73). Thus on 
average, participants reported a low level of uncertainty on the five items at follow-up. 
 
When the individual items were ranked by mean uncertainty at baseline, the means ranged from 
2.85 to 1.86 (Fig. 1). The highest uncertainty was for the ability of the participant to detect 
cancer early. The lowest uncertainty was for the ability to follow through with the recommended 
cancer detection check ups. 
 
Figure 1. Percent of respondents who are uncertain for each item at time 1 and time 2. 
Changes in Uncertainty Before and After Genetic Counseling/Testing 
Mean uncertainty at follow-up for the five individual items ranged from 2.31 to 1.83. Given the 
importance of reducing uncertainty as indicated by the participants, we examined changes in 
uncertainty for all five individual items. Significant decreases in uncertainty over time were 
observed for item 8 “I am coping well with my genetic test result” (P < 0.001) and item 10 “I will 
be able to detect signs of cancer early” (P = 0.005). There were no significant differences in the 
remaining individual items. Total uncertainty decreased significantly from a mean of 2.34 to 2.03 
(P = 0.004) (Table III). There were no gender differences in total uncertainty at baseline or one-
month follow-up and no gender differences in the change in total uncertainty between baseline 
and follow-up. 
Table III is omitted from this formatted document. 
Correlates of Uncertainty 
We examined demographic variables and variables related to possible increased vulnerability 
(being a carrier, being older, having less adequate medical insurance, having more children, 
having higher perceived cancer risk, and having higher depression scores, more positive family 
cancer history, a personal history of cancer, more cancer genetic knowledge, and more fatalism) 
and decreased vulnerability (being married, having more education, having higher income, being 
employed, a higher degree of religiosity, more trust in doctor). There was more baseline 
uncertainty in individuals with more children (P = 0.02). None of the other analyses attained 
significance. 
 
Importance of Reducing Uncertainty 
There was no correlation between perceived importance of genetic testing in reducing 
uncertainty and the level of uncertainty as measured by the five-item total uncertainty scale. 
 
Change in Uncertainty Related to Distress and Carrier Status 
Correlation of change scores in uncertainty and anxiety showed no relationship (r = 0.18), nor did 
uncertainty and depression (r = 0.185). The association between change in uncertainty and carrier 
status was examined using a repeated measures ANOVA with total uncertainty at baseline and 
time two and carrier status as a single binary independent variable. The results indicated no 
relationship between change over time and carrier status. The time by carrier status interaction 
was not significant; F(1, 61) = 0.08, P = 0.78. 
DISCUSSION 
In 2001 we scoured the literature for a validated scale to measure uncertainty associated with 
genetic counseling/testing. Although the scales developed by Mishel had been widely used, the 
items on the scale did not measure uncertainty related to genetic counseling/testing. In 2002. 
Cella et al. [2002] developed a nine-item uncertainty subscale of the multidimensional impact of 
cancer risk assessment (MICRA) tool to measure the specific impact of result disclosure after 
genetic testing. Individuals who tested BRCA1/2 positive had higher scores than individuals who 
tested negative. They suggest that the subscale may help differentiate a subset of participants 
who need intervention and/or are at risk for future distress. Interestingly, the MICRA uncertainty 
subscale did not differentiate individuals with true negative results from individuals with 
uninformative negative results. Since uninformative negative results are much more uncertain 
than true negative results, one would expect the scale to differentiate these two categories of 
study participants. In the absence of an alternative, we developed a measure of uncertainty based 
on our clinical experience with cancer genetics clients from a previous study [Botkin et al., 
1996]. This offers a useful opportunity for comparison to the results reported by Cella and 
colleagues who used a different but related measure. 
 
As expected from the experience of others [Mastromauro et al., 1987; Meissen et al., 1991; 
Decruyenaere et al., 1993; Tibben et al., 1993; van der Steenstraten et al., 1994; Bernhardt et al., 
1997; Tessaro et al., 1997], our data supported our first hypothesis. The vast majority of our 
study participants (76%) listed decreasing uncertainty as an important reason for testing. Hughes 
et al. [1997] also found that about 80% of African American women in their study listed 
reducing uncertainty as very important compared to about 65% of Caucasian women. 
 
Our second hypothesis was that individuals with higher uncertainty at baseline would be more 
likely to think decreasing uncertainty is important. Instead, we found no correlation. It is possible 
that individuals with more uncertainty did not believe that genetic testing would reduce their 
uncertainty (similar to the research participants in Croyle et al., 1995) or were more comfortable 
with their level of uncertainty. 
 
Our second hypothesis was that individuals with higher uncertainty at baseline would be more 
likely to think decreasing uncertainty is important. Instead, we found no correlation. It is possible 
that individuals with more uncertainty did not believe that genetic testing would reduce their 
uncertainty or were more comfortable with their level of uncertainty. 
 
Another possibility is that the uncertainty scale and the importance measure were measuring 
uncertainty about different aspects of genetic testing. When asked to rate the importance of 
decreasing uncertainty, study participants might think only of the uncertainty of whether or not 
they inherited the cancer susceptibility in their family, while our uncertainty items measured 
uncertainty about obtaining healthcare, the expectation of positive changes, and coping well with 
results. 
 
Our third hypothesis was that changes in uncertainty from baseline to one month would increase 
in some areas and decrease in other areas. Our clinical experience was that individuals first focus 
on the uncertainty of whether or not they have a disease causing or susceptibility gene mutation. 
Once they learn that they are positive, their uncertainty often shifts to other areas, such as 
whether they can obtain medical care that will help them avoid or survive the condition, and how 
they will cope with the result. When we assessed our total uncertainty scale, we found that two 
of the individual items decreased, total uncertainty decreased, and no individual uncertainty 
items increased. This outcome of decreased uncertainty could be due to the high proportion of 
individuals in our study who did not carry the gene mutation, although our finding of no 
association between carrier status and total uncertainty argues against this explanation. 
 
We chose to use the Control Uncertainty factor as our measure of total uncertainty, since it 
performed cohesively and was most responsive to change before and after testing. The total 
uncertainty score was low, averaging 2.34 at baseline, and decreased to 2.03 at follow-up. It is 
possible that genetic counseling helped decrease uncertainty further by increasing trust in 
participants' ability to obtain appropriate medical resources and participants' ability to cope with 
the risk in their family and/or outcome of testing. This Control Uncertainty factor may be related 
to the idea of perceived personal control (PPC) introduced to the genetic counseling literature by 
Berkenstadt et al. [1999]. They described the concept of PPC and adapted it to genetic 
counseling. They found higher post-counseling PPC among counselees who had been given a 
definite diagnosis, a specific recurrence risk, and been offered prenatal diagnosis. These factors 
are also associated with lower uncertainty. Although we did not measure PPC, our study 
participants' decrease in Control Uncertainty after genetic counseling/testing may be due to a 
similar phenomenon. 
 
Baseline uncertainty was higher in individuals with more children, while all other variables 
examined showed no correlation with baseline uncertainty (hypothesis 4). It is not obvious why 
having more children is associated with higher total uncertainty. Individuals with more children 
may have more uncertainty about positive outcomes because of stronger concerns about their 
children's welfare than their own welfare. In our experience counseling families at high risk for 
family specific BRCA1 mutations, concerns about children come up frequently in counseling 
and parents often verbalize more concern about their children's risks than their own risks. 
 
Both carriers and non-carriers reported significantly fewer symptoms of anxiety at 1 month 
compared to baseline [Kinney et al., 2005]. Our last hypothesis was that a decrease in anxiety 
and depressive symptoms would be positively associated with a decrease in global uncertainty, 
since uncertainty has been shown to cause more distress than either positive or negative genetic 
test results. However, no correlation was found. Baum et al.'s [1997] model predicts that a 
reduction in uncertainty will help reduce distress. They also state that getting a clear outcome 
reduces uncertainty regardless of whether one's risk is increased or decreased, but note that 
research has not directly evaluated this hypothesis. Our findings of a general decrease in 
uncertainty and no correlation between uncertainty and carrier status support this hypothesis. 
 
Our findings have several implications for clinical practice. They continue to support the 
importance to clients of genetic counseling/testing as a means of reducing uncertainty. This 
replicates the findings of Hughes et al. [1997] that this expectation may be even higher in 
African American clients. Our findings that uncertainty about medical care and coping with test 
results was relatively low and decreased after counseling/testing bore out the expectations of 
these clients. Genetic counselors can provide anticipatory guidance about uncertainty associated 
with genetic testing and assess whether their clients expect genetic testing to decrease 
uncertainty, what aspects of uncertainty they think will be reduced, and how important it is to the 
client to reduce uncertainty. 
 
Genetic counselors can provide anticipatory guidance about uncertainty associated with genetic 
testing and assess whether their clients expect genetic testing to decrease uncertainty, what 
aspects of uncertainty they think will be reduced, and how important it is to the client to reduce 
uncertainty. 
 
Items that clustered together and had the highest change scores shared the characteristic of being 
associated with client control. Testing may help clients to reduce the uncertainty about items 
they can control, and it may be important to differentiate the sources of uncertainty that are more 
or less controllable. 
 
Testing may help clients to reduce the uncertainty about items they can control, and it may be 
important to differentiate the sources of uncertainty that are more or less controllable. 
 
Areas for future research include examining uncertainty in other genetic conditions, in a larger 
sample of individuals with positive genetic test results, and in relation to PPC and client 
satisfaction, as well as testing counseling interventions to reduce client uncertainty. It would also 
be useful to develop scales that reliably measure other aspects of uncertainty related to genetic 
counseling and testing, and to differentiate uncertainty related to genetic counseling versus 
genetic testing. 
 
Study Limitations 
The study consists of a relatively small sample size, with all participants being members of a 
single kindred of African American (Creole) ethnicity. Although we were focused on the general 
topic of uncertainty rather than uncertainty specific to this ethnic group, we recognize that these 
findings may not be representative of all individuals, or all African Americans. In addition, many 
members of this kindred participated in a previous linkage study, although they were not given 
genetic counseling or test results at the time of that study. Their previous knowledge and 
experience with genetic testing may be higher than individuals with no previous exposure to 
genetic research. Although this limits generalizability, it also increases our understanding of 
cancer genetic testing offered to both female and male members of a minority ethnic group. All 
participants were counseled/tested in a research setting, which may have significant differences 
from a clinical setting. We had a low number of positive BRCA1 test results in our sample, 
which limits the statistical power of the analysis of the effects of mutation status post-testing. 
 
Another limitation of the study is that we did not separate the effects of genetic counseling and 
genetic testing. Although the literature focuses on uncertainty associated with genetic testing, it 
is likely that genetic counseling affects clients' uncertainty about many aspects of genetic testing. 
For example, a client might learn about additional resources for coping with a positive test result 
(reducing uncertainty), but might also learn that testing will not tell her whether or not she will 
develop cancer (increasing uncertainty). 
 
 
SUMMARY 
Both before and after genetic counseling and/or testing, the vast majority of individuals in the 
study felt that reducing uncertainty is an important reason for genetic testing. The importance of 
reducing uncertainty was stable across time and unrelated to anxiety or demographics. Factor 
analysis identified a five-item total uncertainty scale that was sensitive to changes before and 
after testing. The items in the scale were related to uncertainty about obtaining health care, 
positive changes after testing, and coping well with results. Overall, we found that study 
participants revealed a low level of uncertainty regarding genetic testing and total uncertainty 
decreased after genetic counseling and/or testing. After genetic counseling/testing, there was less 
uncertainty about the ability of participants to detect cancer early and to cope well with a positive 
result, compared to before genetic counseling/testing. Further research into the complexity of 
clients' uncertainty about genetic testing will help understand the views of individuals 
undergoing genetic counseling/testing and inform interventions to help them manage uncertainty. 
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